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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred by Utah Code § 78-2a-3-(2)(d) (1953, as
amended).
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is a contract action on a rental agreement culminating in a bench trial. Judgment was entered against Nancy Gortsema ("Appellant") by the Honorable LeRoy H.
Griffiths for rental payments, costs and attorney's fees. This judgment is being appealed
here.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to admit as evidence a notarized statement on
hearsay grounds?
2. If the trial court did err in refusing to admit the notarized statement, was the
error reversible as required by Utah law?

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Rules 801(c) and 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. (Rule 801(c))
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these
rules. (Rule 802)
Rule 6L Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence,
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything
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done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to
the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The evidence appellant attempted to enter at trial amounted to hearsay because it
carried with it the implied assertion that the document had been mailed to appellee. At
trial, the preparer of the statement was not available for cross-examination as to the implied assertion, i.e., that it had been mailed to appellee. The evidence was, therefore,
properly excluded by the court.
Even if the statement had been admitted, it was not evidence that it had been
mailed, as asserted by appellant. On the face of the document, there is no evidence of
mailing and the document could be evidence only that the notarized statement had been
prepared, not that it had been mailed. The ultimate outcome of the trial would not have
been affected by the evidence. There was, therefore, no substantial prejudice arising from
the court's refusal to enter the evidence. Lacking substantive prejudice and the likelihood
that the outcome would have been different, any error in refusing to admit the evidence is
harmless error and is not reversible.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE NOTARIZED STATEMENT OF APPELLANTS EMPLOYER WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE AS HEARSAY.
Appellant attempted at trial to offer into evidence a notarized statement prepared
by appellant's employer, stating that she was being transferred. A statement of this type
was, pursuant to the terms of the rental agreement, required to be mailed to Property
Management Services,
Had the statement been offered into evidence for the purpose of proving that it had
been prepared, the hearsay rule would not apply and the statement would be admissible.
E.g., State v. Sorensen, 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980). Likewise, offering the statement as
evidence that appellant had obtained it from the employer would not give grounds for a
hearsay objection. The hearsay problem arose when appellant attempted to introduce the
statement as evidence that it had been mailed as required by the rental agreement. (Appellant's Brief, page 5.) (Note: Appellant also appears to assert that because appellee
received a copy of the statement during discovery, the notice requirements of the rental
agreement had been met. Appellant's brief, page 5. This assertion is irrelevant to either
the trial or this appeal.)
Using the statement for purposes of proving its mailing attaches implied significance
to the document which cannot be determined from its face or the circumstances of its
preparation. The implication is that because the document exists, it must certainly have
been mailed. McCormick in his work on evidence discusses implied assertions and notes
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that non-verbal communication intended to be an assertion is hearsay. McCormick, Evidence 3d, § 250, p. 739 (1984).
To properly admit the statement for evidence of anything beyond the fact of its
existence requires the proper foundation.. Further the preparer must be available for cross
examination of any assertions, implied or otherwise, e.g., that the document had been
mailed. Appellant did not provide proper foundation nor was the preparer available for
cross examination. These are the circumstances where a party must be protected from out
of court statements, the very purpose for which the hearsay rule evolved.
The notarized statement, as intended for use by appellant., carried with it an implied
assertion which the appellant intended to prove the truth of. As such, the trial court
properly excluded the document as hearsay.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL
COURT'S EXCLUSION OF THE HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
IF AN ERROR OCCURRED, IT DID NOT AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND DID NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Assuming for argument that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the notarized
statement into evidence, that error is not reversible. Where an exclusion of evidence does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties, a judgment cannot be disturbed and the
court must disregard the error. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of
Appeals may only reverse the trial court's judgment "if there is a reasonable likelihood that,
absent the error, there would have been a result more favorable to the [appellant]." Matter of Estate of Keslen 702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 1985), citing Lee v. Mitchell Funeral Home
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Ambulance Serv.. 606 F.2d 259, 261 (Utah 1980) and Rowlev v. Graven Bros, 26 Utah 2d
448, 451, 491 1" ,.\J 1209, 1211 (1971). A reversible error must be "suhstanlial and pit, pun in
cial.

Rigtrup v. Sti aw berry Watci Uscis Assn. ih.1 P.2d 1247, 1251 n. il (Utah 1977).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court properly excluded the notarized statement as hearsay. Even il (lie
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exclusion were in error, however, appellant has failed to show substantial and prejudicial
impact of that error, making the error not reversible. The judgment of the trial court
should, therefore, be affirmed.
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Respectfully submitted this / / day of April, 1991

Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr.
Attorney for Appellee
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